Perspectival truth:  Michael Haneke’s «The castle» and the fragmentation of the real by Rozzoni, Claudio





PERSPECTIVAL TRUTH:  
MICHAEL HANEKE’S «THE CASTLE»  




1. «An honorable enterprise» 
Haneke’s	1997	adaptation	of	Franz	Kafka’s	Das Schloß (The Castle)	
is	 thus	 far	 his	 last	 work	 for	 television1.	 Although	 «the	 Austrian	
film	 almanac	 lists»	 it	 «as	 a	 feature	 film»	 and	 it «was	 released	 in	
Austrian	 cinemas	 before	 its	 television	 première»	 (Holmes	 2007,	
109)2,	 Haneke	 has	 always	 professed	 The Castle	 to	 be	 a	 TV	 film	
adaption,	 «an	 honorable	 enterprise»	 aimed	 at	 «bring[ing]	 litera-
ture	closer	 to	 an	 audience»	(Haneke	 1997,	 33)3.	 This	 is	 a	 signifi-
cant	remark,	as	it	conveys	a	belief	that	this	specific	double	status	–	
qua	TV	product	and	qua	adaption	of	a	literary	work	–prevents	film	
adaptation	 from	 being	 considered	 «autonomous	 art»	 (Haneke	
1997,	33).	For	one,	he	states,	a	work	destined	for	TV	by	definition	
«serves	audience	expectations»	(Haneke	2001).	For	another,	as	an	
adaptation,	 a	 work	 is	 necessarily	 dependent	 upon	 its	 original	
                                                 
1	 Before	 being	 well-known	 as	 a	 very	 influential	 film	 director,	 Michael	 Haneke	 began	
working	for	television	in	1967	(Holmes	2007,	109).	His	first	TV	film,	i.e.,	After Liverpool 
(1974),	 was	 released	 long	 before	 his	 first	 feature	 film,	Der siebente Konti-
nent	(The	Seventh	Continent),	which	was	issued	in	1989.	This	should	not	come	as	a	sur-






2	 However,	 that	 reportedly	 happened	 against	 Haneke’s	 will:	 «The Castle,	 for	 example,	
was	 in	 fact	made	for	 television,	even	 though	 it	 will	now	 be	 shown	 in	 movie	 houses	 as	
well.	In	my	view,	film	adaptations	are	not	genuine	works	of	art.	And	I	don’t	really	know	







has	 to	 decide.	 Either	 I	 use	 a	 book	 as	 a	 quarry	 for	 ideas	 for	 something	 that	 I	 want	 to	
create	myself,	then	it	is	a	failed	project	as	a	film	adaptation,	or	it	is	to	be	a	film	for	a	tele-
vision	program	that	has	a	commitment	to	cultural	standards»	(Haneke	1997,	33).	
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source.	 While,	 at	 least	 at	 this	 ‘statement	 of	 intent’	 level,	 such	 as-
sertions	draw	a	clear	distinction	between	The Castle	and	Haneke’s	
films	 for	 theatrical	 release,	 they	 nevertheless	 outline	 a	 peculiar	
Spielraum	for	such	an	«honorable	enterprise»,	particularly	in	two	








pecially	 as	 regards	 the	 stylistic	 similarity	 characterizing	 the	 re-
presentation	of	real	and	fictitious	occurrences.	This	is	a	phenome-
non	that	Haneke	also	discusses	in	connection	with	mainstream	ci-
nema	 and	 its	 relationship	 of	 mutual	 influence	 with	 «electronic	
media»4.	According	to	him,	 this	has	 led	to	perilous	consequences	




occurrences5.	 In	 such	 a	 «pollut[ed]»	 iconosphere,	 he	 claims,	 the	
audience	becomes	progressively	«blind»6	to	the	dimension	of	real-
ity	that	those	images	still	claim	to	show	(a	warning	that	clearly	re-
sonates	 with	 Jean	 Baudrillard’s	 thesis	 concerning	 the	 forms	 of	
«modern	iconoclasm»7,	i.e.,	a	sort	of	destruction	of	images	through	
their	profusion,	annihilation	via	multiplication).		













pollution,	 but	 it’s	 less,	and	 it	 can	 be	 cleansed	 with	 good	 music.	 In	 case	 of	 the	 eyes,	 it’s	
more	difficult»	(Kusturica	&	Testor	2004).	
7	«Modern	 iconoclasm	no	 longer	consists	 in	destroying	 images,	but	 in	manufacturing	a	
profusion	of	images	where	there	is	nothing	to	see.	These	are	literally	images	that	leave	
no	trace»	(Baudrillard	1996,	118-119).	
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terested	 in	 the	 approach	 Kafka	 chooses	 in	 order	 to	 «solve	 the	
question	 of	 how	 literature	 can	 reflect	 reality»,	 i.e.,	 through	 a	
«fragmented	 narration»	 (Haneke	 1998,	 45,	 my	 translation)9.	 In-






true	 to	 [his]	 convictions	 and	 yet	 do	 the	 work	 of	 someone	 else»	
(Haneke	1997,	33,	my	italics)10.	
	
2. A fragmented narrative 
It	is	well-known	that	Kafka’s	novel	is,	in	fact,	an	unfinished	work11.	
The	story	famously	tells	of	a	man,	K.,	who	arrives	in	a	village	one	
late	 evening	 and	 enters	 an	 inn	 looking	 for	 a	 place	 to	 spend	 the	
night;	shortly	thereafter,	a	young	man	claiming	to	be	«the	son	of	
the	 castle	 warden»	 tells	 him	that	 the	 village	 belongs	 to	 «the	 cas-
tle»	and,	 without	a	permit,	 he	 must	 leave.	 Although	 initially	 puz-
zled,	 K.	 subsequently	affirms	 that	 he	 has	 been	 summoned	by	 the	
castle	as	a	land	surveyor	[Landvermesser],	adding	that	his	two	as-
sistants	 are	 supposed	to	be	 joining	him	the	 day	after.	 The	young	
man	 immediately	 seeks	 confirmation	 by	 ringing	 up	 the	 castle;	 a	
representative	of	the	castle	initially	seems	to	deny	any	association	
with	 the	 so-called	 land	 surveyor,	 but	 another	 phone	 call	 arrives	





















was	 truly	 summoned	 by	 the	 castle,	 or	 whether	 he	 made	 up	 the	
story	and	the	castle	is	playing	along;	in	fact,	this	question	is	never	
answered).	 From	 that	 point	 on,	 K.	 attempts	 to	 gain	 the	 castle’s	
recognition	as	a	land	surveyor,	albeit	without	success	(at	least	un-
til	 the	 end	 of	 the	 novel,	 which,	 as	 mentioned,	 breaks	 off	 mid-
sentence).	
Like	the	1922	original	version	of	the	book,	the	film	opens	in 
medias res –	as	with	Diderot’s	Jacques the Fatalist,	we	do	not	know	
‘where	 K.	 is	 coming	 from’	 or	 ‘where	 he	 was	 truly	 headed’	 –and	
ends	ex abrupto.	 In	 the	 very	 first	 scene,	 we	see	 K.	 (Ulrich	 Mühe)	
arriving	 at	 the	 inn,	 his	 entrance	 accompanied	 by	 the	 voice-over	
reading	 the	 very	 first	 sentence	 from	 Kafka’s	 novel:	 «It	 was	 late	
evening	when	K.	arrived [Es war	spätabends, als K. ankam]»	(Kafka	
1922,	 5).	 After	 the	 final	 visual	 sequence,	 in	 which	 K.	 is	 shown	
walking	 with	 Gerstäcker	 (Wolfram	 Berger)	 through	 snow	 and	
heavy	wind	while	the	voice-over	reads	the	novel’s	last	fragmented	
sentence	 («she	 spoke	 with	 difficulty,	 it	 was	 hard	 to	 understand	
her,	but	what	she	said	[mühselig sprach sie, man hatte Mühe sie zu 
verstehen, aber was sie sagte]»	(Kafka	1922,	274)12,	 the	film	ends	
with	a	black	frame	stating	that	«At	this	point,	Franz	Kafka’s	frag-
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Indeed,	 the	 use	 of	 the	 black	 frames	 punctuates	 The Castle’s	 frag-
mented	cinematic	style13,	articulating	the	film	in	«segments».	Such	
interruptions	 create	 an	 «in	 between»	 space,	 breaking	 the	 flux	 of	
the	audience’s	 vision	 and,	 in	 principle,	 leaving	blanks	 for	 the	 au-
dience’s	 imagination	 to	 get	 in	 motion14.	 Besides,	 given	 Haneke’s	
explicit	 reference	 to	 TV	 audience	 expectations,	 one	 might	 provo-
catively	 say	 that	 such	 moments	 of	 black	 emptiness	 are	 the	 anti-
pode	 of	 commercial	 breaks,	 in	 which	 spectators’	 potential	 space	
for	 free	 imagination	 is	 overfilled	 with	 advertising	 content.	 This	
fractured	structure	is	marked	not	only	by	black	screens,	but	also	
using	 outdoor	 tracking	 shots	 showing	 K.	 laboring	 through	 the	





shots	 providing	 the	 audience	 with	 an	 overarching	 framework	
through	which	to	unify	the	many	fragmentary	scenes	into	a	cohe-
sive	whole.	
Camera	 movements	 seem	 to	 stress	 the	 indoor/outdoor	 al-
ternation.	When	 K.	 is	 outdoors,	 he	 is	almost	 invariably	shown	 in	
profile,	 moving	 laterally	 across	 the	 screen	 (tracking	 shots).	 Out-
side,	K	only	moves	toward	or	away	from	the	camera	when	he	en-
ters	 or	 exits	 an	 indoor	 space15.	 Conversely,	 when	 K.	 explores	 in-
door	 environments,	 the	 camera	 employs	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 tech-
niques:	 deep	 focus,	 reverse	 shots,	 close-ups	 that	 fragment	 the	
scene,	partial	or	obstructed	views	of	people	or	objects,	and	vary-
                                                 
13	Let	us	recall	that	this	is	a	technique	that	Haneke	already	experimented	with	in	his	Der 
siebente Kontinent	 (The Seventh Continent,	 1989)	 and	 71 Fragmente einer Chronologie 
des Zufalls (71 Fragments of a Chronology of Chance,	1994)	–	the	first	and	third	films,	the	
second	 being	 Benny’s Video	 (1992),	 in	 his	 «glaciation	 of	 feelings»	 [Vergletscherung der 
Gefühle]	 trilogy	 –	 and	 that	 he	 employs	 again	 in	 Code Unknown (Code inconnu: récit in-
complet de divers voyages, 2000).	Also,	it	 is	 interesting	to	remark	that,	 in	 the	1994	and	






scenes,	 the	 film	 is	 divided	 into	 segments,	 and	 one	 could	 say	 that	 the	 contradiction	 be-













running	 horizontally	 down	 the	 hallway	 connecting	 the	 rooms	 of	
the	gentlemen	from	the	castle.	As	has	been	aptly	pointed	out,	the	
very	«distinction	 between	 inside	and	outside	also	 erodes»	 (Price	
2010,	307)	in	such	instances.	
In	fact,	even	though	castle’s	 indoor	cinematography	implies	
more	 ‘in-depth’	 inspection	 (fig.	 3;	 5),	 it	 appears	 clear	 that	 going	
deeper	 does	 not	 lead	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 quest,	 either:	 zooming	 in	
brings	 us	 no	 closer	 to	 the	 ‘truth’	 than	 the	 lateral	 motion	 of	 the	





yss	 behind	 every	 ground,	 under	 every	 ‘groundwork’»	 (Nietzsche	











                                                 
16	On	this	point	see	also	Brady	&	Hughes	2016,	190.	











3. Defying TV expectations 





















Haneke	 seeks	 to	 call	 into	 question	 the	 ideal	 of	 a	 seamless	
and	fluid	relationship	between	text	and	image:	his	declared	fideli-
ty	to	the	text	does	not	imply	that	his	imagery	is	merely	obedient	to	
it,	 acting	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 illustration,	 perhaps	 to	 generate	 interest	 in	
the	book	–	Haneke’s	previous	remarks	on	the	primacy	of	the	lite-
rary	source	undoubtedly	cannot	be	reduced	to	such	a	banal	inter-
pretation.	 Rather,	 he	 wants	 to	 develop	 a	 specific	 rhythmic	 inter-
change	between	 images	 and	 text,	 one	 wherein	 misalignment	and	
mismatching	 foster	 mutual	 exchange	 and	 enrichment	 between	




Thus,	 for	 instance,	 the	 voice-over	 can	 contrast	 with	 the	 ac-
tion	we	see	on-screen,	eliciting	a	sense	of	ambiguity	and	a	critical	
distance	 and	mistrust	 in	 what	 is	 seen	 and	said,	 respectively19.	 In	
several	 instances,	 the	 voice-over	 overlaps	 the	 dialogue	 «to	 indi-
cate	 where	 a	 character’s	 articulation	 is	 overlaid	 with	 K.’s	 or	 the	
narrator’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 reason	 for	 speaking	 rather	 than	
the	spoken	words	themselves»	(Brady	&	Hughes	2016,	190-191).	
Nevertheless,	 it	should	be	stressed	that	the	voice-over	here	is	by	
                                                 
18	See	for	example	Riemer	2011,	130.	
19	 See	 also	 Schlicker	 2013,	 12-14.	 On	 several	 occasions,	 «sound	 and	 image	 are	 not	 in	
sync»,	 a	 strategy	 that	 can	 be	 considered	 a	 feature	 of	 Haneke’s	 style	 (see	 Knauβ	 2005,	
266-267).	In	fact,	there	is	sometimes	an	overt	discrepancy	between	what	is	narrated	and	
what	 is	 shown:	 «Das Schloβ	 uses	 the	 relation	 between	 voice-over	 and	 visual	 image	 to	






keep	 him	 out’,	 though	 the	 on-screen	 action	 shows	 her»	 closing	 the	 door	 «without	 any	
visible	struggle»	(Rowe	2017,	153).	
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no	 means	 an	 omniscient	 thread	 connecting	 the	 fragments,	 creat-
ing	unequivocal	order	to	guide	the	audience	toward	the	correct	in-
terpretation.	 Rather,	 the	 voice-over	 is	 itself	 a	 part	 of	 the	 frag-
mented	 whole.	 Such	 interplays	 help	 establish	 mutual	 control	 be-










topic	certainly	deserves	development	 in	 its	 own	right,	 I	 do	 think	
that	is	not	too	much	of	a	leap	to	affirm	that	the	two	notorious	per-
petrators	 in	 Funny Games	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 possible	 variation,	 a	
metamorphosis,	 another	 mask	 of	 the	 two	 assistants	 in	 The Cas-










                                                 
20	On	such	an	interfilmic	connection	cf.	for	example	also	Woods	2014,	205-207.	










Figure	9.	Screenshot	from	Funny Games (1997) 
	
Thus,	Haneke	makes	no	concessions	here	to	what	he	considers	to	
be	 TV	 audience	 expectations.	 There	 is	 no	 embellishment	 in	 The 
Castle,	 no	 extra-diegetic	 music	 or	 dramaturgical	 signposting	 to	
lead	 the	 audience	 to	 the	 ‘correct’	 interpretation,	 nothing	 that	 ca-








tions	 as	 regards	 cliché	and	 conventional	 assumptions	 as	 to	 what	






that	would	cause	the	 film	to	«lose[…]	 its	quality	of	realism»,	 the-
reby	undermining	the	goal	of	his	exercise.	 If	elements	of	the	Kaf-
kaesque,	as	a	peculiar	kind	of	«grotesque»,	are	to	be	found	in	The 
Castle,	 they	 do	 not	 come	 in	 the	 form	 of	 any	 ready-made	 clichés	
(e.g.,	a	series	of	visual	artifices	commonly	used	to	induce	a	sense	
of	 the	 grotesque	 in	 the	 audience).	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 The 
Castle	is	incapable	of	expressing	the	«grotesque»,	but	rather	that	it	










their	 own	 receptivity	 toward	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 real.	 In	 fact,	 it	
should	be	 emphasized	 that	 Haneke’s	 The Castle	 is	 clearly	 not	 ex-
                                                 
21	 «Now	if	you	 become	 theatrical	 in	 film	 in	 order	 to	 transport	 the	 grotesque,	 then	 you	




under	the	standard	of	the	book	because	he	abandons	reality,	and	Kafka	is nothing if not 
real.	That	means,	if	one	decides	to	convey	this	real level of Kafka,	then	one	has	to	sacri-
fice	 the	 grotesque.	 The	 grotesque	 then	 only	 appears,	 so	 to	 speak,	 in	 the	 contradictori-
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clusively	 aimed	 at	 people	 who	 are	 unfamiliar	 with	 Kafka’s	 novel	
(this	 might	 well	 imply	 the	 assumption	 that	 television	 audiences	
are	 uncultured	 and	 need	 Haneke’s	 help	 discovering	 Kafka,	 whe-
reas	 arthouse	 film	 audiences	 are	 well-read	 and	 require	 no	 such	
invitation	–	a	patronizing	blanket	judgment	indeed).	His	film,	qua	
selective	 fragmentation,	 is	 one	 possible	 variation	 of	 the	 novel	
played	through	another	medium,	one	that	might	prompt	viewers	




4. Only representatives 
One	of	the	central	issues	both	film	and	book	resolutely	confront	us	
with	regards	the	true	nature	of	«the	castle».	This	question	relates	
intimately	 to	 our	 understanding	of	 what	 we	call	 «truth»	(and,	 as	
just	 hinted,	 with	 our	 understanding	 of	 what	 we	 call	 «values»).	
More	specifically,	The Castle’s	fragmented	style	appears	to	put	into	
question	 a	 metaphysical	 construal	 of	 ‘Truth’	 and	 ‘Values’	 as	 self-








leuze	 &	 Guattari	 1975,	 3).	 These	 entrances	 are	 not	 governed	 by	
any	specific	order	whereby	one	is	assigned	more	importance	than	
another	–	none	of	 the	castle’s	entrances	can	be	deemed,	a	priori,	
more	 valuable	 than	 any	 other,	 though	 they	 may	 differ	 greatly	 in	
appearance;	 in	 principle,	 every	 fragment	 of	 the	 castle	 has	 the	
power	to	lead	us	into	it23.	In	fact,	even	without	having	consciously	
chosen	 to	 enter	 the	 castle,	 one	 might	 later	 learn	 or	 realize	 that	
they	 have	 stepped	 through	 one	 of	 its	 manifold	 entrances	 –	 as	
might	be	the	case	with	K.,	who	ends	up	in	castle	territory	seeming-
ly	by	chance.	
Nevertheless,	 it	 should	 be	 stressed	 that,	 even	 though	 it	 is	
possible	to	enter	the	castle	from	any	of	the	fragments	belonging	to	
                                                 
23	«We	will	enter,	then,	by	any	point	whatsoever;	none	matters	more	than	another,	and	
no	 entrance	 is	 more	 privileged	 even	 if	 it	 seems	 an	 impasse,	 a	 tight	passage,	 a	 siphon»	
(Deleuze	&	Guattari	1975,	3).	
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it,	 it	 appears	 that	 one	 can	 never	 reach	 «the»	 castle,	 properly	
speaking.	 K.	 never	 gets	 to	 touch	 it,	 we	 might	 say,	 in	 its	 original 
presence.	 In	 the	 novel,	 when	 he	 arrives	 at	 the	 village	 «lay[ing]	
deep	 in	 snow»,	 there	 is	 «nothing	 to	 be	 seen	 of	 Castle	 Mount,	 for	




is	 uncertain,	 ever-changing	 –	 and	 on	 closer	 inspection	 it	 looks	
more	 like	 «an	 extensive	 complex	 of	 buildings»	 than	 a	 castle,	 and	
«if	you	hadn’t	known	it	was	a	castle	you	might	have	taken	it	for	a	
small	town»	(Kafka	1922,	11).	






tance	 to	 the	 castle	 by	 shifting	 it	 to	 a	 representational	 level24.	 In	
fact,	the	very	first	frame	is	an	enigmatic	depiction	that	might	pic-
ture	the	castle;	the	spatial	distance	becomes	an	iconic	distance,	a	











                                                 
24	On	this	point	see	also	Holmes	2011,	125-126.	
25	See	Brady	&	Hughes	2016,	188.	












ering	 it	 completely	 and	 allowing	 only	 its	 shadowed	 outline	 to	
shine	 through	 (fig.	 12-15).	 Let	 us	remark	 that,	 in	 both	 these	 two	
entrances,	the	depiction	is	visible	to	the	spectator’s	eye	but	not	to	
K.’s.	 When	 he	 steps	 through	 the	 door,	 the	 image	 remains	 at	 his	
back;	he	cannot	see	it,	or	at	least	not	while	we	are	able	to	see	it.	As	




                                                 
26	See	Holmes	2011,	127,	note	9.	













respect	 to	 the	 novel	 reinforce	 its	 impalpability.	 For	 instance,	 Ha-








other	hand,	 shows	 K.	 looking	 through	 the	 peephole	but	 does	 not	
let	us	see	what	Klamm	looks	like	–	we	are	called	to	imagine	him.	
In	 this	 sense,	 Haneke’s	 treatment	 seems	 to	 emphasize	 that	
the	castle	is	everywhere	and	yet	nowhere.	It	is,	in	itself,	ultimately	
invisible	and	impossible	to	grasp:	in	principle,	everything	can	sig-
nify	 it,	 and	 yet	 every	 sign	 of	 it	 essentially	 points	 elsewhere,	
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beyond	 itself.	 The	 castle	 manifests	 itself	 only	 through	 its	 repre-
sentatives	(people,	letters,	phone	calls)	–	that	is,	by	delegation.	Its	
representatives	 and	 signs	 may	 emerge	 from	 anywhere,	 at	 any	
time.	 However,	 the	 original	 castle,	 the	 alleged	 Truth	 beyond	 its	
manifestations,	is	never	to	be	reached.	
	
5. In the name of Whom/What? 
We	can	then	suggest	that	what	emerges	from	such	considerations	
is	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 castle	 is	 less	 a	 thing	 than	a	 process,	 a	moving 
structure.	 In	 this	 sense,	 there	 would	 be	 nothing	 physical	 beyond	
the	castle	as	a	process,	and	the	idea	of	a	‘castle	in	itself’	might	then	
turn	out	 to	be	merely	a	deceptive	effect	–	 the	castle	 is	unreacha-
ble,	 ‘untouchable’.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 construing	 the	 castle	 as	 a	
fixed	 abstract	 meaning	 preceding	 and	 grounding	 this	 process	
would	not	be	correct	either;	in	that	case,	the	process	would	simply	
be	 construed	 as	 symbolizing	 or	 metaphorizing	 its	 principle.	 In	






ever-changing,	 as	 are	 its	 borders	 and	 field	 of	 action.	 Even	 so,	 no	
one	 questions	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 castle	 or	 the	 righteousness	 of	








audience	 to	 doubt	 the	 consistency	 of	 such	 a	 transcendent	 prin-
ciple	in	the	first	place.	Indeed,	readers	(and,	even	more	so,	specta-
tors	 of	 Haneke’s	 fragmented	 variation)	 are	 also	 confronted	 with	
the	concept	of	a	purely	formal	law,	an	idea	Deleuze	traces	back	to	
Kant’s	 characterization	 of	 moral	 law	 in	 his	 second	 Critique,	 in	
which	the	latter	–	in	a	«revolution	[…]	perhaps	even	more»	radical	
than	the	well-known	 Copernican	revolution	 in	his	 first	Critique	–	
overthrows	the	«classical	conception	of	the	law»	by	positing	a	law	





There	 is	 no	 need	to	 linger	here	on	 the	 specifics	of	how	 De-
leuze	 interprets	 Kant’s	 conception	 of	 the	 law.	 For	 our	 purposes,	
the	 key	 aspect	 to	 consider	 is	 that	 of	 these	 two	contrasting	views	
on	 the	 relationship	 between	 law	 and	 its	 alleged	 grounding	 prin-
ciple	 –	 a	 point	 all	 the	 more	 important	 in	 that,	 ultimately,	 it	 con-
cerns	the	nature	of	the	relationships	between	fragments	and	truth	
as	well	as,	as	we	shall	see,	between	images	and	reality.	According	
to	this	second,	 ‘Kantian’,	view	elucidated	by	Deleuze,	 the	 law	is	a	




and	 punishment27,	 a	 point	 that	 he	 significantly	 links	 directly	 to	
«the	 world	 described	 by	 Kafka»	 (Deleuze	 1967,	 84)	 –	 and	 let	 us	
remark	how	Haneke	considers	«guilt	[…]	the	first	question	in	all	of	
Kafka’s	 works»,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 «all»	 his	 own	 «films,	 including	 The 
Castle»	(Haneke	2000,	147).	
Deleuze	 suggests	 that	 the	 continuous	 formal	 repetition	 of	
law’s	 injunctions	 puts	 its	 subjects	 in	 a	 state	 of	 precarious	 equili-
brium,	 implying	 an	 a priori possibility	 of	 guilt:	 the	 subject’s	 ob-
edience	 is	 always	 only	 a	 temporary	 reassurance	 and	 might	 even	
reinforce	his	or	her	sense	of	guilt28.	In	other	words,	the	more	one	
obeys	the	process	and	tries	 to	 follow	it,	 the	 larger	one’s	sense	of	




tial	 counterpart	 on	 the	 other:	 the	 sense	 of	 guilt	 the	 subject	 feels	
                                                 
27	«THE	LAW,	as	defined	by	its	pure	form	[…],	is	such	that	no	one	knows	nor	can	know	
what	 it	 is.	 It	operates	without	 making	 itself	known.	 It	defines	a	realm	of	 transgression	
where	one	is	already	guilty,	and	where	one	oversteps	the	bounds	without	knowing	what	
they	are	[...].	Even	guilt	and	punishment do	not	 tell	us	what	the	 law	is,	but	 leave	 it	 in	a	
state	of	indeterminacy	equaled	only	by	the	extreme	specificity	of	the	punishment»	(De-
leuze	1967,	83-84,	my	italics).	




from	 the	 case	 that	 obedience	 to	 the	 law	 secures	 a	 feeeling	 of	 righteousness»	 (Deleuze	
1967,	84).	
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over	 the	 mere	possibility	of	 transgressing	 the	 law,	 even	 acciden-
tally.	
In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Milan	 Kundera	 recognizes	 the	 concept	 of	




ical) dimension»	 (Kundera	 1979,	 101-102).	 In	 fact,	 Kundera	 em-
phasizes	how	the	process	carried	out	by	the	law’s	manifold	repre-
sentatives	 leads	 to	 the	 deceptive	 assumption	 of	 metaphysical	










free	will.	It’s	the	well-known	situation	where	the offense seeks the 
punishment»	 (Kundera	 1979,	 102).	 Accordingly,	 then,	 we	 might	
say	 that	 the	 title	 of	 Dostoevsky’s	 masterwork	 implies	 a	 consecu-
tion:	the	Crime,	the	offense,	precedes	and	justifies	the	Punishment.	
In	 Kafka,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 Kundera	 suggests	 that	 «the	 logic	 is	
reversed.	The	person	punished	does	not	know	the	reason	for	the	
punishment.	 The	 absurdity	 of	 the	 punishment	 is	 so	 unbearable	
that	to	find	peace,	the	accused	needs	to	find	a	justification	for	his	




from	 the	 castle’s	 aura.	 Depending	 on	 the	 positions	 they	 occupy	
within	 the	 process,	 certain	 individuals	 can	 appropriate	 this	 aura	
for	 themselves	 and	 exercise	 a	 portion	 of	 the	 castle’s	 power	 over	
those	 in	 weaker	 positions.	 This	 can	 result	 in	 sadistic	 and	 maso-
chistic	dynamics	within	several	layers	of	the	community,	a	theme	
strongly	 present	 in	 Kafka’s	 work.	 Haneke	 decides	 to	 show	 K.	
watching	 as	 Frieda	 cracks	 a	 whip	 at	 Klamm’s	 servants	 «in	 the	
name	of	Klamm»	(fig.	15).	A	moment	later,	Frieda	puts	her	foot	on	
K.	 (fig.	 16),	 before	 they	 roll	 across	 the	 floor	 together	 and	 then	
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30	On	these	aspects	cf.	also	Knauß	2005,	269-270.	





Amalia’s	 family	 after	 she	 refuses	 to	 obey	 a	 letter	 from	 a	 castle	
functionary,	Sortini,	summoning	her	to	the	Castle	Inn.	As	Amalia’s	
sister	Olga	 relates	 to	 K.,	 upon	 receiving	 this	 missive	 from	a	 mes-
senger	 and	 reading	 it,	 Amalia	 tears	 the	 letter	 up	 and	 throws	 the	
pieces	into	the	messenger’s	face.	Amalia’s	father	loses	his	job	and	
his	 honor,	 and	 finally	 ends	 up	 begging	 anyone	 with	 any	 connec-
tion	 to	 the	 castle	 whatsoever	 to	 find	 a	 path	 for	 forgiveness	 (the	
story	and	the	dynamics	of	Amalia’s	family	disgrace	are	amply	de-
veloped	 in	 the	 novel).	 However,	 although	 Amalia’s	 family	 is	 pu-
nished	after	Amalia’s	refusal,	 the	castle	makes	no	official	accusa-
tions	on	the	matter31.	Clearly,	this	is	an	example	in	which,	in	order	
to	 be	 able	 to	 atone	 and	 obtain	 forgiveness,	 the	 punished	 person	
must	 first	 be	 recognized	 as	 guilty32.	 In	 Kafka’s	 worlds,	 where	
those	 judged	 often	 cannot	 find	 a	 place	 within	 or	 outside	 the	
process,	 leaving	them	in	a	kind	of	 limbo,	 this	might	appear	to	be	
the	only	possibility.	
	
6. Fragmentation as perspectivism 
In	Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche	 warned	 that	 «no	 error	 is	 more	
dangerous	 than	 that	 of	 confusing the cause with the effect»	
(Nietzsche	 1888,	 176).	 From	 this	 standpoint,	as	 we	 are	 trying	 to	
suggest,	the	idea	of	a	castle	as	independent	principle	might	also	be	
construed	 as	 the	 result	 of	 a	 temporal	 illusion	 produced	 by	 the	
après coup	phenomenon	of	projecting	an	effect	of	a	process	in	the	
past,	 thereby	 retroactively	 deeming	 it	 the	 metaphysical	 origin	 of	
that	process.	This	is	not	to	imply	that	such	a	retrospective	move-
ment	 is	 erroneous	 per se.	 The	 danger,	 however,	 lies	 in	 potential	
blindness	to	the	manner	in	which	an	effect,	a	result,	is	silently	and	
inadvertently	hypostatized	as	a	fixe,	separate	origin	of	the	process	
–	what	Bergson	 would	 call	a	 «retrograde	 movement	 of	 the	 true»	
(Bergson	1922).	
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those	 values	 merely	 projectional	 –	 and	 thus	 purely	 relative	 –	 in	
nature.	However,	this	relativistic	stand	would	represent	an	overly	
simplistic	 upheaval	 of	 the	 classical,	 Platonistic	 view,	 one	 still	
caught	within	the	framework	of	a	true-false	dichotomy:	on	the	one	
side,	we	have	the	idea	of	a	fixed,	stable	Truth	that	is	the	real	cause	
of	 every	 appearance	 we	 encounter,	 a	 Truth	 that	 is	 always	





any	 essential	 truth	 whatsoever,	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 nihilistic	 outcome.	




too	 hastily	 linked	 to	 Nietzschean	 famous	 adage,	 «there	 are	 no	
facts,	only	interpretation»)	suggests	that,	if	there	is	no	Truth,	any-
thing	–	and,	therefore,	nothing	–	can	be	true.	




nipresence	of	 the	 false33	–	he	 famously	remarks	that	«along with 










of	 the	 cave,	 and	 to	 overturn	Platonism	 would	 initially	 seem	to	 imply	 a	 reversal	of	 this	
standard	 relation:	 what	 languishes	 below	 in	 Platonism	 must	 be	 put	on	 top;	 the	 super-
sensuous	must	be	placed	 in	 the	service	of	 the	sensuous.	But	 such	an	 interpretation,	as	
Heidegger	 showed,	 only	 leads	 to	 the	 quagmire	 of	 positivism,	an	 appeal	 to	 the	 positum	
rather	than	the	eidos».	










phers,	 someone	 wanted	 to	 completely	 abolish	 the	 ‘world	 of	 appearances,’	 –	
well,	 assuming	 you	 could	 do	 that,	 –	 at	 least	 there	 would	 not	 be	 any	 of	 your	
‘truth’	left	either!	Actually,	why	do	we	even	assume	that	‘true’	and	‘false’	are	in-




Affirming	 the	 essential	 perspectivism	 of	 our	 experiences	 (their	




Haneke’s	 work	 develops	 this	 point	 extensively,	 especially	
through	his	above-mentioned	theme	of	fragmentation.	On	the	one	
hand,	reality	is	an	enigma	to	him35,	and	he	makes	no	hasty	conces-
sions	 to	 any	 metaphysical	 notion	 of	 reality	 independent	 of	 ap-
pearances;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 does	 not	 lead	 him	 to	 dismiss	
the	 value	of	 the	 quest	 to	 describe	 reality,	 the	different valeurs	of	
the	 diverse	 possible,	 albeit	 non-arbitrary,	 narratives	 through	
which	 we	 weave	 our	 fragmented	 experiences	 from	 our	 perspec-
tives,	continuously	redefining	the	scope	of	what	we	consider	real.	
He	constantly	denounces	the	phony	sense	of	safety	several	main-
stream	 directors	 give	 audiences	 through	 dramaturgical	 patterns	
thought	 to	 convey	 an	 expected	 outcome	 –	 always	 presupposing	
the	existence	of,	if	not	directly	disclosing,	an	objective	and	truthful	
narrative	 underlying	 the	 manifold	 appearances	 presented	 to	 the	
viewer.	




tively	 measuring	 reality	 from	 above	 encompassing	 all	 its	 ele-
ments,	 reveals	 itself	 to	 be	 «forced	 into	 the	 bifurcation	 of	 the	 es-
                                                 
34	On	this	point	cf.	also	Gori	2016,	38.	
35	See	Kusturica	&	Testor	2004.	





For	 such	 a	 panoptic	 conception	 of	 truth,	 ‘good’	 images	 would	 be	
those	 most	 suitable	 for	 objectively	 and	 exhaustively	 measuring	
the	 truth	 –	 ‘land	 surveying	 images’,	 so	 to	 speak.	 However,	 this	
kind	 of	 abstract,	 overarching	 eye	 betrays	 the	 nature	 of	 truth,	 for	
our	 experiences	 of	 truth	 are	 essentially	 perspectives,	 and	 the	
perspectival	 view	 should	 not	 be	 considered	 a	 deficiency	 that	 an	
omniscient	eye	would	come	to	adjust.	
Cinematically,	 renouncing	 this	 construal	 of	 truth	 signifies	
abandonment	of	the	«organic»	description	and	narration	Deleuze	




ages’	 –	 «truthful[ly]	 […]	 claim[…]»	 to	 conform,	 «even	 in	 fiction»	
(Deleuze	1985,	127).	Within	this	framework,	the	‘good’	narration	
disqualifies	 all	 others.	 One	 fairly	 banal	 example	 of	 this	 might	 be	
when,	 in	 a	 film	 (whether	 fictional	 or	 non-fictional),	 the	 camera	
lens	 shows	 us	 ‘what	 really	 happened’,	 thereby	 tacitly	 claiming	
that,	at	that	moment,	it	is	the	neutral	eye	that	can	see	the	truth	ob-
jectively,	as	if	it	were	not	perspectival	itself.	
This,	 of	course,	 is	 exactly	 the	 kind	 of	cinematic	 eye	 Haneke	
avoids	using.	As	noted,	The Castle	uses	no	‘land	surveying	images’	
to	give	the	spectator	a	reassuring	overview;	the	opening	image	of	
the	 inn	 door,	 though,	 as	 we	 saw,	 it	 could	 potentially	 represent	 a	
sort	of	old	map	representing	the	village	and	the	castle,	 is	merely	
another	 fragment	 among	 fragments. Even the	 word	 «land	 sur-
veyor	 [Landvermesser]»	 run	 through	 the	 film	 from	 mouth	 to	
mouth	as	an	old	function	that	can	still	be	recognized	as	a	name	but	







describes	 his	 cinematic	 reconfiguration	 of	 fragments	 in	 terms	 of	
«Riemanian	spaces»,	a	«connecti[on]	of	parts»	that	«is	not	prede-
                                                 
36	In	this	respect	cf.	also	Grundmann	et	al.	2020,	xi.	




As	a	matter	of	 fact,	Bresson’s	oeuvre	 is	well	within	 that	«crystal-
line»	regime	that,	here,	Deleuze	opposes	to	the	«organic»	(see	De-
leuze	 1985,	 126-137).	 In	 «crystalline	 narration»,	 like	 the	 one	 we	
are	 seeking	 to	 outline	 here,	 the	 «fracture»	 (Deleuze	 1985,	 128),	
the	 fragmentation	 becomes	 the	 essential	 element	 that	 «puts	 the	
notion	of	truth	into	crisis»	(Deleuze	1985,	130).	Explicitly	inspired	
by	 Nietzsche,	 Deleuze	 states	 that	 this	 new	 regime,	 one	 which	 he	
qualifies	 as	 «fundamentally	 falsifying»	 (Deleuze	 1985,	 131),	
brings	 about	 that	 «the	 truthful	 man	 dies»,	 that	 «every	 model	 of	
truth	collapses»	(Deleuze	1985,	131).	However,	I	would	consider	
it	 paramount	 to	 specify	 that	 the	 models	 of	 truth	 collapsing	 are	
those	 construed	 as	 metaphysically	 separate	 from	 their	 narrative	
interpretations;	 this	 must	 not	 result	 –	 also	 from	 a	 Nietzschean	
standpoint	–	in	the	collapse	of	all	ideas	of	truth	whatsoever.	Ana-
logously,	 the	 general	 possibility	 that	 in	 the	 fragmented	 regime	
«the	 very	 possibility	 of	 judging	 is	 called	 into	 question»	 (Deleuze	
1985,	138)	must	not	result	in	the	equally	untenable	assertion	that	




ment	 of	 the	 appearance,	 once	 the	 idea	 of	 an	 appearance-
independent	 truth	 has	 been	 dismissed,	 every	 manifestation	 can	
matter,	 can	 hold	 some	 specific	 value,	 without	 that	 specific	 value	
making	the	manifestation	true	or	false	–	this,	obviously,	does	not	
prevent	 it	 from	 being	 considered	 good	 or	 bad38.	 Every	 fragment	
participates	 in	 the	 movement	 through	 which	 only	 truth	 consti-
tutes	itself.	This	could	certainly	be	one	sense	in	which	to	consider	
Haneke’s	 appreciation	 of	 Kafka’s	 fragmented	 style:	 a	 fragmented	
approach	might	be	more	faithful	to	reality,	because	reality	itself	is	
constituted	 through	 a	 series	 of	 fragmented	 perspectives,	 frag-
                                                 
37	And	this	holds	true,	I	would	maintain	in	contradiction	of	Deleuze’s	well-known	inter-
pretation,	also	as	regards	Welles’	worlds.	 In	 fact,	 in	«The	powers	of	 the	 false»	chapter,	
Deleuze	 famously	 talks	 of	 the	 «Nietzscheanism»	 of	 Welles,	 stating	 that	 he	 «constantly	
constructs	 characters	 who	are	unjudicable	 and	 who	have	 not	 to	 be	 judged,	 who	evade	
any	possible	 judgement.	If	 the	 ideal	of	truth	crumbles,	the	relations	of	appearance	will	




38	 A	 point	 explicitly	 remarked	 by	 Deleuze	 in	 reference	 to	 Nietzsche	 (cf.	 Deleuze	 1985,	
141).		





same’	 narrative	 can	 take	 on	 different	 values	 when	 incorporated	
into,	or	reacting	to,	other	narratives	(as	an	example,	consider	how	
in	The Castle	Frieda’s	actions	take	on	a	different	color	–	to	employ	
Nietzsche’s	 painting	 metaphor	 –	 when	 viewed	 through	 Pepi’s	
perspective).	 In	 that	 sense,	 I	 think	 Deleuze’s	 insistence	 on	 «the	
powers	of	the	false»	risks	to	remain	unduly	fixated	(both	termino-




not	 tantamount	 to	 the	 perspectivism	 of	 truth	 implying	 perspec-
tive-related	 (but	 non-arbitrary)	 axiological	 levels	 we	 have	 at-





that	 is	 unceasingly	 redefined	 through	 the	 intersections	 and	 inte-
ractions	 among	 different	 perspectives,	 each	 of	 which	 may	 be	 at-
tributable	 to	 the	 same	 subject	 or	 different	 subjects39.	 Again	 and	
again,	new	perspectives	can	interact	through	contrasts,	fractures,	
incorporations,	and	so	on.	This	process	might	be	endless,	but	it	is	
not	 arbitrary.	 The decisive question becomes: under what condi-
tions, from what perspective, is it possible for a subject to feel that 
value, to perceive that reality, and correspondingly to react that 
way?40.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 richness	 of	 the	 perspectives	 a	 subject	
considers	when	forming	his	or	her	notion	of	reality	becomes	deci-
sive,	although	no	overarching	point	of	view	can	encompass	all	of	
these	 perspectives	 at	 once:	 however	 exhaustive	 a	 subject’s	 posi-








advance	 inserted	 into	 a	 system	 of	 partial perspectives,	 referred	 to	 one	 same	 world	 in	
which	we	coexist	and	where	our	views	intersect»	(Merleau-Ponty	1964,	82,	my	italics).	
40	 Within	 this	 framework	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 Haneke’s	 considerations	 on	 violence	 in	 Ha-
neke	2009.	See	also	Haneke	2005b,	38-39.		




her	 spectrum	 of	 what	 he	 or	 she	 calls	 truth.	 In	 principle,	 each	 of	
these	perspectives	affects	 the	constitution	of	 the	 ‘palette’	of	«dif-
ferent valeurs».	
In	 this	 regard,	 Haneke	 goes	 as	 far	 as	 to	 describe	 postmo-
dernism	 –	 or,	 at	 least,	 the	 postmodernism	 epitomized	 in	 the	
«claim	 that	 all	 the	 existential	 and	 moral	 questions	 are	 behind	
us»41–as	 «dangerous	 nonsense»,	 as	 a	 «Fun-Ideology»	 (Haneke	
2007,	 122,	 my	 translation).	 Haneke	 places	 great	 importance	 on	
this	point.	We	have	stressed	how	he	insists	that	the	director	must	
avoid	 imposing	his	 or	 her	own	explanations	 of	 the	 on-screen	 ac-
tion;	rather,	he	says,	directors	must	leave	space	for	viewers	to	de-
velop	 their	 own	narratives	and	 images,	and	 to	experience	 values	
essentially	 related	 to	 those	 perspectives.	 It	 should	 be	 mentioned	
that	 one	 might	 see	 a	 certain	 patronizing	 component	 to	 Haneke’s	




He	 does	 not	 view	 his	 work	 as	 a	 medium	 through	 which	 to	
snobbishly	hand	nuggets	 of	clearly	 defined	truth	 to	 the	 audience	
‘from	above’,	but	rather	an	attempt	to	renounce	the	specific	dra-
maturgical	 devices	 and	 tricks	 aimed	 at	 providing	 reassuring	 an-
swers	about	reality	and	its	complexity.	Haneke’s	audiences	are	not	
given	more	freedom	so	much	as	more	responsibility42:	they	have	















Auteuil)	and	Majid	(Maurice	Bénichou):	«We	don’t	know	if	Georges	 is	 telling	 the	 truth,	
and	we	don’t	know	if	Majid	 is	telling	 the	 truth.	We	don’t	really	know	which	one	of	 the	
characters	is	lying	–	just	as	we	don’t	know	in	real	life»	(Haneke	2005a,	80).	
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